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Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) study a model of public insurance with a continuum of
individuals when the individual's ability to supply labour is aÞected by a random variable,
health, which is unobservable by government. Thus the government faces a moral hazard
constraint that if unemployment insurance is too generous workers will be tempted to
claim ill health when they are able to work. One assumption that Diamond-Mirrlees
made was that there were no private insurance markets. The objective of this paper is to
allow for optimal private insurance and to examine the interactions between public and
private insurance and examine whether public insurance will crowd out private insurance
and whether a mixture of public and private insurance is ever optimal.
We consider an inßnite horizon version of the Diamond-Mirrlees model. The advan-
tage of the private insurance scheme is that individuals can observe the health status
of their fellow workers. Thus the private insurance scheme faces no moral hazard prob-
lem. The private insurance scheme however, cannot enforce payments in the way that
the government can. The private insurance scheme is voluntary and individuals will only
participate if they expect long-term beneßts from the scheme.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the Diamond and Mirrlees (1978)
model. Section 3 develops the dynamic model of private insurance with a continnum of
individuals. The steady-state solution is fully characterized and the issue of stability of
the steady-state examined. Section 4 outlines the moral hazard problem faced by public
insurance. Section 5 brings the previous two sections together and considers whether
public insurance will crowd out private insurance and whether there is an optimum mix
of public and private insurance. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 The Literature
A number of authors have considered government insurance. Diamond and Mirrlees (1978)
consider moral hazard, where the government is unable to observe whether unemployed is
due to inability to work or is voluntary. Whinston (1983) extends the Diamond-Mirrlees
model to allow for adverse selection caused by multiple unobservable types who have
diÞerent probabilities of illness. Anderberg and Andersson (2000) consider the case where
workers can inàuence their probability of disability by choice of occupation.
Our model of private insurance builds upon the informal or implicit insurance ar-
rangements between employers and workers considered in Thomas and Worrall (1988).
This has been extended by a number of authors and a general model of mutual insurance
with n-persons and storage is given by Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000). The extension
to a continuum of individuals is considered by Kreuger and Perri (1999) and in a ßnance
context by Lustig (2001). In contrast to these papers, the current paper proves results
on optimal private insurance using only straightforward arbitrage arguments.
1The crowding out issue is considered in a static context by Arnott and Stiglitz (1991).
The trade-oÞ they examine is between internal household insurance and public insurance.
The government has better opportunities to pool risk but faces a moral hazard problem
not faced within the household. The contrast in this paper is not that the government
has better pooling opportunities but that it has a better enforcement technology. A
similar dynamic model of private insurance and crowding out is Attanasio and Ræ ios-
Rull (2000) who examine a large number of small-sized private insurance schemes which
do not interact with each other but only with the aggregate insurance provided by the
government. Although Kreuger and Perri (1999) allow for a government in their model of
private insurance with a continuum of individuals, they cannot consider optimal crowding
out as they assume that the government faces no moral hazard constraint. This is precisely
the issue we address. A dynamic model that does consider the interaction between private
and public insurance is Di-Tella and MacCulloch (2002). They analyse a stationary model
of private insurance with a ßnite set of family members and show how public insurance
can crowd out private insurance but that the social optimum involves either private or
public insurance and no mix of the two is optimal. Our model is a considerable advance
on theirs in studying the optimal dynamic private insurance and we use this optimum
to construct an example where a mix of public and private insurance indeed dominates
either public or private insurance alone.
2 Static Model
This sections brieày outlines the single period social insurance model introduced by Di-
amond and Mirrlees (1978). There is a continuum of ex ante identical individuals. An
individual is either capable of labour supply or not. There is a probability p 2 (0;1) known
to all that an individual is incapable of work (ill). We assume that w is the marginal
product of work which is equal to the wage because of perfect competition in the labour
market. We let b denote unearned income which is independent of labour supply capabil-
ity. Unearned income is assumed to be at subsistence level so that consumption cannot
fall below b. The utility of consumption c 2 C ² <+ if working is u(c). The utility
of consumption if not working is v(c) and the utility when not working due to illness is
v(c)   d. Both u(c) and v(c) are real-valued functions.
Assumption 1 Positive but diminishing marginal utility: u0(c) > 0, v0(c) > 0,
u00(c) < 0, v00(c) < 0.
Assumption 2 Work is unpleasant: v(c) > u(c) 8c.
Assumption 3 Employment is preferable to unemployment: u(w + b) > v(b).
We will assume that it is desirable to share risk and transfer some income from the
employed to the unemployed.
2Assumption 4 Risk-sharing is desirable: u0(w + b) < v0(b).
We will also make an assumption on the disutility of labour.
Assumption 5 v0(cu) = u0(ce) implies ce = cu + k for some constant w > k µ 0.
Remark 1 One special case that satisßes these assumptions is when there is a ßxed
disutility of employment, so that u(c) = v(c) x; in this case k = 0. Another special
case is when the leisure is a perfect substitute for consumption and utility of not
working is v(c) and the utility of working is u(c) = v(c x), so that k = x represents
the disutility of labour supply independent of the level of consumption.
Remark 2 Assumption 5 implies Assumption 4 that risk-sharing is desirable.
3 Dynamic Informal Insurance
In this section we outline the model of informal insurance in a two-person and in a
continuum economy.
The time horizon is inßnite and time is divided into discrete periods t = 0;1;2;:::. We
assume that each household is ex ante identical, inßnitely lived and discounts per-period
utility at a constant factor of ® 2 (0;1). Per-period utility is determined by a state-
dependent von Neumann-Morgernstern utility index as in Section 2. Each individual has
a constant probability of illness, p, which is independent of time and other individuals.
Thus by the law of large numbers, there is a constant fraction of the population, p, unable
to work at any time period. There is complete information: all members of the private
insurance arrangement can observe the health status of everyone else so everyone knows
who is able to work and who is not. However, there is no enforcement mechanism, so any
transfers must be designed to be self-enforcing. For this section there is no government, so
no taxes or government transfers. We shall introduce the government public insurance in
Section 4 and examine the interaction between public and private insurance in Section 5.
Let ht denote the employment history of an individual up to and including date t.
This history is simply a list of employment status at each date. Let ut denote unemploy-
ment at date t and et denote employment at date t. Then ht is a list of e's and u's. To
proceed we make the following assumption of horizontal equity.
Assumption 6 Horizontal equity: Any two agents with the same history ht receive
the same consumption allocation.
Remark 3 Thus we are ruling out random contracts or contracts in which agents
with the same history alternate their consumptions. Thus we rule out the posibility
that the contract allows some healthy agents to be unemployed while agents with
the same history are employed.
3We imagine an informal insurance scheme in the continuum where those able to work at
date t and have a history ht 1, transfer an amount ¼(ht 1) and those unable to work at
date t receive ¸(ht 1).1 We will assume that any individual who reneges on the transfer
will be excluded from future receipts and therefore will not make any further transfers.
Note too that since there is complete information, feigning ill-health will be observed
and regarded as a deviation from the agreed on insurance scheme. Thus anyone deviating
in this way is assumed to be punished with autarky in the future. Since, by Assumption
3, shirking yields a lower utility than working, and as a deviation need only be considered
when an agent is called upon to make a positive payment, no agent would choose to
deviate by shirking since this is dominated by failing to make the payment and working.
Hence we can ignore shirking in this section. Thus agents are either well and employed or
ill and not; the option of feigning sickness does not arise. The moral hazard problem will
become important again in the Sections 4 and 5 when we examine public unemployment
insurance.
The short-term loss to an employed individual of making the transfer at time t of
¼(ht 1) relative to not making the transfer is
u(b + w   ¼(ht 1))   u(b):
Let ce(ht 1) = b+w ¼(ht 1) be the consumption of an employed worker at date t given
the history ht 1. The short-term gain at date t for those unable to work is (note the d's
cancel out)
v(b + ¸(ht 1))   v(b):
Again let cu(ht 1) = b + ¸(ht 1) be the consumption of an unemployed worker at date
t given the history ht 1. The discounted long-term gain from adhering to the agreed






®j ((1   p)(u(b + w   ¼(ht+j))   u(b)) + p(v(b + ¸(ht+j))   v(b)))
3
5:
where the expectation E is taken over all future histories from date t onward, ¼(ht+j) is
the payment made by an employed worker at date t + j + 1 given that the history up
to time t was ht and ¸(ht+j) is the payment received by an unemployed worker at date
t + j + 1. Letting U(ht) denote the net discounted surplus utility from date t + 1 in an
employment state, i.e. where the history is ht+1 = (ht;e), and V (ht) be the net surplus
in an unemployment state, i.e. where the history is ht+1 = (ht;u), we have the recursive
equations
U(ht) = u(b + w   ¼(ht))   u(b + w) + ® ((1   p)U(ht;e) + pV (ht;e));
1We assume for now that ¼ and ¸ are non-negative and show subsequently that this is in fact the case.
4V (ht) = v(b + ¸(ht))   v(b) + ® ((1   p)U(ht;u) + pV (ht;u)):
We view the sequence of transfers as an implicit or social contract. If an individual
reneges on this social contract, then since individuals are identißable, they will be ostra-
cized and excluded from the contract and not receive any transfers in the future. Since
there is no enforcement mechanism, an individual will only be prepared to make a trans-
fer if the long-term beneßts from doing so outweigh the short term costs. Since reneging
leads to exclusion, the discounted surpluses must be non-negative at every history
U(ht) µ 0 and V (ht) µ 0 8 ht:
An employed worker is said to be constrained if after a suácient relaxation of the
constraint U(ht) µ 0 it would be possible to ßnd a Pareto-improvement from date t + 1
onward. An employed worker who is constrained has a zero surplus U(ht) = 0 but an
employed worker with a zero surplus is not necessarily constrained. Similar deßnitions
apply to the unemployed worker.
With no enforcement mechanism, although risk-sharing may be desirable, it may not
be feasible if ® is small or p is large as the long-term gains cannot outweigh the short-term
costs of making a transfer. Thus we make a further assumption to ensure that risk-sharing
in the dynamic economy is feasible absent any government transfers.
Assumption 7 Risk-sharing is feasible:
® >
u0(w + b)
(1   p)v0(b) + pu0(w + b)
:
This condition is derived by considering whether any small tax and subsidy that is con-
stant over time can improve on autarky and satisfy the non-negative net surplus con-
ditions. Alternatively the inequality may be expressed as a low enough probability of
illness, i.e.:
p <
®v0(b)   u0(b + w)
®(v0(b)   u0(b + w))
:
Given Assumption 4 that v0(b) > u0(b + w), Assumption 7 is satisßed for ® close enough
to one. Indeed we know from the folk theorem of repeated games that for ® close enough
to one, the ßrst-best level of risk sharing with v0(cu) = u0(ce) = u0(cu   k) is sustainable.
We will mainly be concerned with situations where the ßrst best is not sustainable. That
is for discount factors such that
® <
u(b + w   p(w   k))   u(b + w)
(1   p)(u(b + w   p(w   k))   u(b + w)) + p(v(b + (1   p)(w   k))   v(b))
:
53.1 The two-person economy
For a two-person economy, we can use the results of Thomas and Worrall (1988). To
make the comparison with the continuum economy, assume that employment status is
perfectly negatively correlated. Then the transfer ¼ made by the employed worker is
equal to the transfer received ¸ by the unemployed worker. The per-capita resources of
this two person economy are b + w
2 in each period and there is no aggregate uncertainty.
Per capita resources in the continuum economy are b + w
2 when the probability p = 1
2
which we will assume for the purposes of comparison. Let the ßrst-best transfer be ¼££.
By Assumption 5 the ßrst best transfer satisßes ¼££ ´ w
2 . From Thomas and Worrall
(1988) it follows that associated with each state, employment or unemployment, there is
an time-independent interval for consumption and a simple updating rule which is to keep
the marginal utility of consumption constant across states or moves consumption by the
smallest amount to keep it within the interval. The consumption intervals are illustrated
in Figure 3.1. The top interval determines consumption in the employment state and the
lower interval consumption in the unemployment state. The consumption levels at the
ßrst-best are b+w ¼££ and b+¼££. As discussed above for a large enough discount factor,
the ßrst-best transfer will be sustainable and the two intervals will extent to these ßrst-
best levels. For smaller discount factors the ßrst-best will not be sustainable. The lower
of the interval endpoints correspond to the individual getting zero net surplus whereas at
the top of the endpoint the surplus is at the maximum level. By the updating rule once
the employment status has switched, the employed individual will have consumption of
b + w   ¼ at the bottom of the upper interval and the unemployed individual will have
consumption of b+¼ at the top of the lower interval. At the bottom of the upper interval
the employed individual is not prepared to make any larger transfer as the short-term
costs are too high. Thus the employed individual is constrained at this point and has a
net surplus of U = 0. The unemployed individual has a short-run gain and thus has a
positive net surplus, V > 0 (future surpluses are non-negative by construction).
The surplus V is determined recursively by:




and likewise the surplus U must satisfy:




Given that ¼ = ¸ these two equations can be rearranged to give
u(b + w)   u(b + w   ¼) =
(®
2)(v(b + ¼)   v(b))
(1   ®
2)
which can be solve for ¼ as a function of the parameters b, w, and ®. For ¼ = 0 the
LHS and RHS of this equation are zero. For ¼ > 0 the LHS is positive, increasing and
6Figure 1: The Consumption Intervals
convex, the RHS is positive, increasing and concave. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1. By
Assumption 4 u0(w + b) < v0(b), so for ® large enough the slope of the RHS at ¼ = 0,
(1   ®
2)v0(b)=(1   ®
2) is steeper than the slope of the LHS, u0(b + w) but for small enough
® < ®£ the opposite is true and the only solution is ¼ = 0. For large discount factors
® > ®££ > ®£, the optimum transfer ¼££ can be sustained and the two curves intersect
at a ¼ > ¼££. For intermediate values of ®, the optimum transfer is determined by the
intersection of the two curves. As ® increases, the optimum value ¼£ increases.
3.2 Results in continuum case
The results of Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) show that in a model of informal
insurance with n households, unconstrained households have the same growth rate in
marginal utility and constrained households which have zero net surplus have a lower
marginal utility growth rate. Lemmas 2 and 3 show that the same is true in the continuum
economy. This follows from simple arbitrage arguments which consider transfers between
two individuals so as to equalise the marginal rate of substitution between two dates. It is
to be remembered that an individual is distinguished by their employment history. So we
will denote the measure of agents with history ht 1 by ¶(ht 1). Since the probability of
illness is independent of history, ¶(ht 1;et) = (1 p)¶(ht 1) and ¶(ht 1;ut) = p¶(ht 1).2
2If « is the number of periods of unemployment, then ¶(ht) = p
«(1   p)
(t «).
7Figure 2: The Solution in the Two-Person Case
The next lemma shows that given Assumption 7 there will be some households with
strictly positive net surplus.
Lemma 1 Given Assumption 7, then there will be some individuals with strictly
positive surplus at each date.
Proof: If all individuals have zero surplus at time t + 1, i.e. U(ht) = V (ht) = 0, then
the only transfers that are feasible at date t are zero, i.e. ¼ = ¸ = 0. We now show that
a small transfer of É > 0 from the employed to the unemployed at every date forward
will be beneßcial. The transfer received by the unemployed is È =
(1 p)
p É. The change
in surplus for the employed worker is




pv0(b)È + (1   p)u0(b + w)É
¡
:









(pu0(b + w) + (1   p)v0(b))
³
:
This change is positive given Assumption 7 and the change in surplus for the unemployed
worker is even greater. Hence if all agents have a zero surplus at any date it would be
possible to ßnd an improvement that meets all self-enforcing constraints. Thus at each
date there will be some subset of agents with a strictly positive surplus. k
8Lemma 2 All workers with a strictly positive surplus at date t (i.e. unconstrained
workers),whether employed or unemployed, have the same growth rate in marginal
utility between t   1 and t.
Proof: Consider two types of individual with employment histories ht 1 and h0
t 1. Let
the measure of each type be ¶(ht 1) and ¶(h0
t 1). Suppose w.l.o.g. that the employment
status for these two types over the next two time periods is (et;ut+1) and (et;et+1).
Suppose that neither of these types are constrained at time t + 1 so that V (ht 1;e) > 0
and U(h0
t 1;e) > 0. Now consider a small transfer of É from each of the employed at
time t with history ht 1 with this transfer equally distributed to each of the employed at
time t with history h0
t 1. The probability of moving to employment at date t is (1   p),









Suppose at time t + 1 there is a transfer È in the opposite direction. Thus those with
employment history (ht 1;et;ut+1) get
È¶(h0







Picking È and É small, the approximate change in utility of an employed worker at date







where ce(ht 1) is the consumption of an employed worker at date t given the history
ht 1 and cu(ht 1;e) is the consumption of the unemployed worker at date t+1 given the





















  ®(1   p)u0(ce(h0
t 1;et))È:
Then substituting for È gives the approximate change in utility for the employed worker





















9Now choose the sign of É to be the same as the sign of the last bracket in this equation.
If the bracketed term is non-zero, then this will lead to an improvement in utility for the
employed at time t with history h0
t 1. Also by construction É and È have the same sign.
Thus if É < 0, È < 0 and this involves a transfer from the unemployed at time t + 1
with history (ht 1;e). But this is feasible since by assumption they are unconstrained,
V (ht 1;e) > 0. Likewise if É > 0, this will involve a transfer from the employed at
time t + 1 with history (h0
t 1;e), but again this is feasible as U(h0
t 1;e) > 0. Such a
change raises the discounted utility of the employed with history h0
t 1 and by construction
does not lower the discounted utility of the employed with history (ht 1;e). Equally no
constraint at any previous date is violated as all constraints are forward looking. Thus if
the initial contact is eácient the bracketed term in the last equation must be zero and
the growth rate in marginal utility for both types must be the same. It is clear that by
repeating the above argument the same applies for any pair of employment histories we
choose. k
Lemma 3 Any worker that is constrained and therefore has a zero surplus, has a
growth rate in marginal utility that is no greater than any unconstrained worker.
Proof: This follows from the previous lemma. Suppose again that there are two types
of individuals with histories ht 1 and h0
t 1 and assume that the employment histories
at times t and t + 1 are (et;ut+1) and (et;et+1). Suppose that the type with history
(h0
t 1;e;e) is constrained at date t + 1 and suppose that this type has a higher growth











Then if the type with history (ht 1;e;u) is unconstrained at date t + 1 it follows from
equation (1) that the surplus of the individual with history (h0;e;e) can be improved by
choosing É < 0. However, since U(h0
t 1;e) = 0, it is not possible to choose É > 0 and
hence the bracketed term in equation 1 is non-positive. k
Lemma 4 If ce(ht 1) 6= cu(ht 1), then the individual with the higher consumption
is constrained.
Proof: The agent with the higher consumption has the lower growth rate in marginal
utility and thus is constrained and has a zero surplus. k
Let g(t) denote the growth rate in marginal utility for an unconstrained individual
from date t to date t + 1. For example if the individual is employed at both dates then




10A direct implication of the fact that the constrained agents have a lower growth rate
in marginal utility and thus higher consumption at date t + 1 is that the unconstrained
growth rate in marginal utility is non-negative.
Lemma 5 Given Assumption 5, the growth rate of the marginal utility of uncon-
strained agents satisßes g(t) µ 0.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that g(t) < 0. This implies that for every agent marginal
utility at time t is greater than the marginal utility at time t + 1 no matter what the
states at each date or whether the worker is constrained or not. Consider a worker with
history ht 1. If the history is ht+1 = (ht 1;e;e) then ce(ht 1;e) > ce(ht 1). Likewise for
the history ht+1 = (ht 1;u;u), cu(ht 1;u) > cu(ht 1). For the history ht+1 = (ht 1;u;e),
it follows from Assumption 5 that ce(ht 1;u) > cu(ht 1) + k and similarly that for the
history ht+1 = (ht 1;e;u), cu(ht 1;e) > ce(ht 1)   k. Since the probability of illness is
independent, the histories ht+1 = (ht 1;e;u), and ht+1 = (ht 1;u;e), are equally likely.
Thus summing over all possible histories ht 1, it follows that aggregate consumption rises
from time t to t + 1, but this is impossible as aggregate resources are unchanged. Thus
we conclude that g(t) µ 0. k
Lemma 6 For a given employment status at date t, higher surplus at date t means
more consumption at date t.
Proof: We want to show that U(ht 1) > U(h0
t 1) if and only if ce(ht 1) > ce(h0
t 1) and
V (ht 1) > V (h0
t 1) if and only if cu(ht 1) > cu(h0
t 1). From the recursive equations
U(ht 1) = u(ce(ht 1))   u(b + w) + ® ((1   p)U(ht 1;e) + pV (ht 1;e))
U(h0
t 1) = u(ce(h0
t 1))   u(b + w) + ®
 
(1   p)U(h0
t 1;e) + pV (h0
t 1;e)
¡




(1   p)U(ht 1;e) + pV (ht 1;e) > (1   p)U(h0
t 1;e) + pV (h0
t 1;e)
Thus either U(h0
t 1;e) < U(ht 1;e) or V (h0
t 1;e) < V (ht 1;e) or both. It is only possible
to have higher surplus if at some future point consumption is higher so w.l.o.g. take this
to be period t + 1. Suppose by way of example that V (ht 1;e) > V (h0
t 1;e) µ 0 and
cu(h0









This implies that (ht 1;et) has a smaller marginal utility growth rate and thus that
V (ht 1;e) = 0 by Lemma 3 which contradicts V (ht 1;e) > 0. A similar argument applies
11if U(ht 1;e) > U(h0
t 1;e) µ 0. To prove necessity again suppose by contradiction that
ce(ht 1) > ce(h0
t 1) but U(ht 1) ´ U(h0
t 1). By the ßrst part of the proof if U(ht 1) <
U(h0
t 1) then we have ce(h0
t 1) > ce(ht 1); a contradiction. Thus suppose that U(ht 1) =
U(h0
t 1). Now choose a convex combination of the contracts so that both types get the
same consumption at all dates from t onwards. By concavity this leads to a Pareto-
improvement, with all the self-enforcing constraints satisßed. Equally all self-enforcing
constraints at past periods are met or relaxed. Thus the original contract could not have
been eácient. k
Lemma 7 For a given employment status at date t, there is a unique consumption
level which delivers zero surplus at date t.
Proof: Follows from previous lemma. k
Lemma 8 (Non-crossing lemma) If consumption is no lower at time t, then con-
sumption in the same state at t + 1 will also mean that consumption is no lower.
Proof: We want to show that e.g. ce(ht 1) µ ce(h0
t 1) implies ce(ht 1;et) µ ce(h0
t 1;et)
and cu(ht 1;et) µ cu(h0











which implies that (h0
t 1;et;ut+1) is constrained from Lemma 3. But by Lemma 6,
V (h0
t 1;et) > V (ht 1;et) µ 0, a contradiction. k
Let ce(t) denote the consumption which delivers zero surplus in employment at date
t and let cu(t) denote the consumption which delivers zero surplus in unemployment at
date t (this is deßned so long as there is a positive measure of agents receiving zero surplus
in each employment state).
Lemma 9 At any time t, b < ce(t) ´ b + w and cu(t) = b .
Proof: It is obvious that ce(t) ´ b + w. If ce(t) > b + w, then there is a short-run gain
for the individual but a net surplus of zero. This would imply a negative net surplus at
some future date which is impossible. Equally by the same argument cu(t) ´ b. But if
cu(t) < b then there is a negative net gain at t which must be oÞset by some positive
net gain in the future. Since the growth rate in marginal utility is non-negative this
would only be possible if cu(t) falls continuously. But this is impossible as consumption
is bounded below. k
We now show that provided the ßrst-best cannot be achieved, any agent employed
at date t is constrained and hence consumes ce(t).
12Lemma 10 Assuming that the ßrst-best is not attainable, at each t an employed
agent is constrained.
Proof: Suppose that the employed at t   1 are all constrained: U(ht 2) = 0 for all
ht 2. To show that the employed at t are constrained, ßrst assume that some who
are employed both at t   1 and t have marginal utility growth equal to g(t) that is
u0(ce(Ý ht 2;e))=u0(ce(Ý ht 2)) = 1+g(t) for some Ý ht 2. We show this is impossible, and hence
all such agents must be constrained at t. First, the growth rate must be the same in the un-
employment state at t: v0(cu(Ý ht 2;e))=u0(ce(Ý ht 2)) = 1+g(t) since otherwise cu(Ý ht 2;e) =
b; by Lemma 9, and thus u0(ce(Ý ht 2;e)) > v0(b); which is impossible. Suppose w.l.o.g. that
thereafter, as soon as the employed state occurs, say at any time t0 µ t + 1, total surplus
discounted to t0 will be zero, i.e., U(Ý ht 2;et 1;st;ut+1;:::ut0 1) = 0 (where st = ut;et).
This is w.l.o.g. as we can consider the path where u is repeated from date t, until the last
time that v0(ce(Ý ht0 2;et 1;st;ut+1;:::;ut00 1))=u0(cu(Ý ht0 2;et 1;st;ut+1;:::;ut00 2)) = 1+
g(t00). Thereafter, by deßnition, as soon as the employed state occurs, total surplus will be
zero. We can use t00 to replace t. To simplify notation, deßne per-period surpluses Se
t 1 =
u(ce(Ý ht 2)) u(w+b), Se
t = u(ce(Ý ht 2;e)) u(w+b) and Su
t0 = v(cu(Ý ht 2;e;u;:::;u)) v(b)
for all t0 µ t (t0   t   1 periods of unemployment after t   1). Note that the surplus from
t+1 on is the same after both histories (Ý ht 1;e) and (Ý ht 1;u); since marginal utilities are
the same at t by assumption, and the transition from t to t+1 depends only on marginal





(using the fact that after date t an employment state implies total surplus from that point
is zero). We have by virtue of U(Ý ht 2) = 0,
 Se












where the inequality follows from U(Ý ht 2;e) µ 0. By U(Ý ht 2;e) µ 0,
 Se
t ´ ®Z: (5)
In view of Su
t0+1 ´ Su
t0 for all t0 µ t due to g(t0 + 1) > 0 (no ßrst-best), we have Su
t µ Su
t0
for all t0 > t. From (2), this implies pSu







We also have Se
t 1 > Se







> ®Z µ  Se
t >  Se
t 1, a contradiction. Since the initial
time period has all employed agents making the same transfer, this transfer must be such
that the employed initially have a zero net surplus and this completes the proof. k
13Theorem 1 At any time t the transition rule from t   1 is determined by two
numbers b + (1   p)w ´ ce(t) ´ b + w and g(t) µ 0 such that the transition between
states satisßes
1. A transition to an employment state
ce(ht 1;u) = ce(ht 1;e) = ce(t):
2. A transition to an unemployment state
(a) From an unemployment state
cu(ht 1;u) =
º
v0 1((1 + g(t))v0(cu(ht 1))); if cu(ht 1;u) µ b
b; otherwise.
(b) From an employment state
cu(ht 1;e) =
º
v0 1((1 + g(t))u0(ce(t))); if cu(ht 1;e) µ b
b; otherwise.
Proof: It has already been shown that the workers either have a growth rate in marginal
utility of g(t) µ 0 or are constrained. Equally it has been shown that employed workers
are constrained, get a zero surplus and consume ce(t) and unemployed workers who are
constrained consume b. k
Note that ce(t) and g(t) are jointly determined via the aggregate resource constraint.
Remark 4 Results are easily generalized to more than two states. For example w
may be state dependent. The same key features apply: unconstrained agents have
the same growth rate in marginal utility and there is some unique consumption
level associated with giving a zero surplus in each state.
Remark 5 It is possible to introduce an aggregate shock, say with w varying over
time but common to all workers.
3.3 The steady-state
In the steady-state ce(t) = ce and g(t) = g independent of t. All employed households
have the same consumption ce and make the same transfer ¼ = b+w ce. They are always
constrained and have a zero surplus, U(ht) = 0 for any past history. The unemployed
are either constrained with consumption of b or are unconstrained and have a marginal
utility growth rate of g. The implications are that if full insurance is not sustainable
ce > b+w ¼££, then there are a ßnite set of consumption states. If there are S +1 such
14states indexed s = 0;1;:::;S, with s = 0 indexing the employed state, then the proportion
of the population in state s in the steady-state is (1   p)ps for s = 0;1;:::;S   1 and pS
for state S.
There are two important things to note here. First, the steady-state determines the
constant distribution of wealth. But although the distribution of wealth is constant over
time, there is mobility of individuals within the distribution as their length of unemploy-
ment or employment status changes. Secondly the unemployed will receive a transfer from
the insurance scheme, but the transfer falls with each consecutive unemployment state
and eventually falls to zero after S periods of unemployment. In the optimum informal
insurance scheme beneßts are declining over time and are time limited.
It is easy to compute the net surplus that each agent receives in the steady-state.
Let cs denote consumption after s successive periods of unemployment. We have cs =
v0 1((1+g)v0(cs 1)) for s = 2;3;:::;S  1, cs = b for s µ S and c1 = v0 1((1+g)u0(ce)).
For notational consistency let c0 = ce be the consumption in the employment state in
the steady-state. Then let Vs denote the net surplus of an unemployed worker who has
had s successive periods of unemployment. Since the employed worker receives a zero net
surplus, the surplus equations are:
0 = u(c0)   u(b + w) + ®pV1
V1 = v(c1)   v(b) + ®pV2
. . . =
. . .
Vs = v(cs)   v(b) + ®pVs+1
. . . =
. . .
VS 1 = v(cS 1)   v(b) + ®pVS
VS = 0
Since an employed worker receives no surplus, the equation for Vs consists only of the
short term utility beneßt v(cs)   v(b) plus the discounted value of the surplus from the
subsequent unemployment period, Vs+1. This surplus is discounted by the adjusted dis-
count factor p® where the discount factor ® is adjusted by multiplying by the probability
of unemployment p. Solving these equations recursively gives
(v(c0)   u(c0)) + (u(b + w)   v(b)) =
S 1 X
s=0
ps®s (v(cs)   v(b)): (7)
Given the distribution of consumption, there is also an aggregate constraint that aggregate




pscs + pSb = b + (1   p)w: (8)
15Since each cs depends only on c0 and g, these two equations together with the condition
that cS = b determine c0, g and S. The aggregate social welfare in the steady-state
relative to autarky is
(1   p)(u(c0)   u(b + w)) +
S 1 X
s=1
(1   p)ps (v(cs)   v(b))):
To see how the steady-state can be computed, consider an example where u(c) =
v(c)   x = loge(c)   x where x is the disutility of labour. In this case cs = c0
(1+g)s for
s = 0;1;:::;S   1. Since g > 0, a constant growth rate in marginal utility translates
to a proportionate fall in consumption with successive periods of unemployment. With
consumptions so determined, the surplus equation (7) can be rewritten as
loge(b)   loge(b + w) =
S 1 X
s=0

















loge(1+g) . Since cS = b, S = dTe where dTe is the smallest integer greater
than or equal to T. Substituting these conditions into equation (9) gives











This provides a continuous mapping from T into the growth rate of marginal utility g.















(1+g) adjusts the probability of unemployment by the proportionate fall in
consumption, so that the consumption of the employed worker, c0 is a function of the




maps T back into itself. Finding a ßxed point of this continuous mapping gives the
steady-state solution. Note that T = 1 is always a ßxed point of the mapping and since T
is deßned on [1;1) there may be no ßxed point greater than one. The two extreme cases
16Figure 3: The Steady-State Solution
are where T = 1 is the only ßxed point and where there is no other ßxed point but the
mapping diverges to inßnity. The ßrst case corresponds to the situation where no private
insurance is sustainable and will occur for a low discount factor or a high probability
of unemployment. The second case applies where full insurance can be sustained by
the private insurance arrangement. These two cases are easily checked in the numerical
analysis so that ßnding a relevant ßxed point for T is an easy computational exercise.
A steady-state distribution is drawn in Figure 3.3. It is drawn for u(c) = v(c) =
loge(c), i.e. where x = 0 and for S = 4.
Example 1 The solution when u(c) = v(c) = loge(c), b = 1, w = 3, p = 1
2, ® = 1
2, is
c0 = 3:11796, g = 0:34132 and S = 4. The unemployed are excluded from beneßts
after four periods of unemployment and the probability of an unemployed individual
receiving no beneßts is 2 4 = 1
16.
3.4 Dynamics
This section considers the dynamics of the optimal private insurance and whether there
may be convergence to the steady-state solution. We consider only the simple example
where S ´ 2. At date t = 1 the initial distribution has a proportion p with unemployed
and receiving cu(1) and a proportion (1   p) who are employed and receiving ce(1). In
the example it is shown that for all subsequent periods S = 2, (1   p) are employed with
consumption ce(t), p(1   p) are in their ßrst period of disability receiving cu(t) and the
17remaining proportion p2 have a longer term unemployment and have a consumption of b.
The employed are constrained in each period.
The aggregate constraint at date t = 1 is
(1   p)ce(1) + pcu(1) = b + (1   p)w
and the aggregate constraint for t > 1 is
(1   p)ce(t) + p(1   p)cu(t) + p2b = b + (1   p)w:




)   u(b + w) + ®p(v(cu(2))   v(b)) = 0
and for t > 1
u(w + (1 + p)b   pcu(t))   u(b + w) + ®p(v(cu(t + 1))   v(b)) = 0:
The dynamic equation is
cu(t + 1) = v 1
²
v(b) +






dcu(t) > 0 and
d2cu(t+1)
d(cu(t))2 > 0. There is a unique (non-
zero) stationary point which by the convexity is unstable. Clearly any unstable path is
ineácient or violates a self-enforcing constraint, therefore consumption will be chosen at
the stable point from t > 1. The next example shows that it is possible to construct the
exact dynamic solution in a simple case.
Example 2 b = 1,w = 3,p = 1
2, ® = 2
5, u(c) = v(c) = loge(c). Then
cu(t + 1) = e5(loge(4) loge( 9
2  1
2cu(t))):
ce(t) = 3:45 for all t µ 1, cu(1) = 1:55 and cu(t) = 2:1 for all t > 1.
4 Public Unemployment Insurance
In this section the static model of public unemployment insurance introduced by Diamond
and Mirrlees (1978) is outlined. Unlike the private insurance scheme, the public insur-
ance scheme must respect a moral hazard constraint since the government is unable to
observe whether the worker is ill. Also unlike private insurance arrangements, taxes, i.e.,
payments into the scheme, can be enforced by the government.
The government chooses the tax ² for the employed and level of subsidy » for the
unemployed that determine the consumption levels ce = b+w  ² and cu = b+» for the
18Figure 4: The First-Best Outcome
employed and unemployed respectively. Because there is a continuum of individuals and
the probability of illness is independent, the aggregate resource constraint is:
(1   p)ce + pcu = b + (1   p)w
or (1 p)² = p». Thus the tax/subsidy scheme is assumed revenue neutral. It is assumed
that ² 2 [0;w] as consumption cannot fall below b. Since the government is unable
to determine why an individual does not workÜare they feigning ill health?Üits policy
must also respect the moral hazard constraint that a healthy individual has no incentive
to claim to be ill rather than working,
u(b + w   ²) µ v(b + »): (10)
The additional aggregate social welfare created by the scheme over autarky is
(1   p)(u(b + w   ²)   u(b + w)) + p(v(b + »)   v(b)):
We assume that the government wants to choose ² 2 [0;w] to maximize this aggregate
social welfare subject to the budget balance and moral hazard constraints.
Theorem 2 (Diamond-Mirrlees) If u(ce) = v(cu) implies u0(ce) ´ v0(cu) for all ce
and cu, then the optimum is determined by the solution to u(ce) = v(cu) and the
budget balance condition (1   p)ce + pcu = b + (1   p)w.
19Figure 5: The Moral Hazard Constraint
Henceforth we will maintain this assumption.
Assumption 8 The moral hazard constraint binds for the government: u(ce) =
v(cu) implies u0(ce) ´ v0(cu) for all ce and cu.
To illustrate this theorem ßrst consider the ßrst-best allocation of Figure 4. At the
ßrst-best only the ill will not work and the marginal utility between working and not
working will be equalised. The autarkic allocation is at the point (b;b+w) and a transfer
of one unit from each of the (1 p) proportion of the population employed will give each
unemployed p=(1   p) units, so the slope of the aggregate budget constraint is p=(1   p).
The social welfare function is (1 p)(u(ce) u(b+w))+p(v(cu) v(b)) and the indiÞerence
curve tangent with the budget constraint is drawn. The slope of the indiÞerence curve is
pv0(cu)=(1 p)u0(ce), so tangency occurs at a point where v0(cu) = u0(ce) and the locus of
such points is also drawn. By diminishing marginal utility, this locus is upward sloping
and the indiÞerence curve is convex. By the assumption that risk-sharing is desirable,
this locus passes below the endowment point. By Assumption 5 at the ßrst-best optimum
the employed get no less than the unemployed, so that the v0(cu) = u0(ce) locus lies above
the 450 line.
Figure 4 illustrates the Diamond-Mirrlees solution. It must involve equal utility for
the employed and unemployed as by the convexity of the indiÞerence curve this gets
closer to the ßrst-best insurance. The solution lies at the intersection between the budget
20constraint and the u(ce) = v(cu) locus. The u(ce) = v(cu) locus lies above the v0(cu) =
u0(ce) locus by Assumption 8 that the ßrst best is not feasible.
5 Crowding Out
In this section we turn to the main issue in this paper. How do the public and private
insurance schemes interact? Does public insurance crowd out private insurance? And can
it be optimal to have a mix of public and private insurance?
To do this we bring together the analysis of Section 3 and Section 4. We consider the
eÞect on the steady-state of private insurance from a (static) government insurance scheme
of the Diamond-Mirrlees type. The public insurance scheme will aÞect the private insur-
ance provision by changing the fall-back utility of both the employed and unemployed.
The public insurance will provide some risk-sharing gains by reducing the variability of
marginal utility for the employed and unemployed. However, in achieving these risk-
sharing gains, the public insurance will make the punishment of removal of future private
insurance from anyone who reneges on their private insurance payments less severe, and
therefore may reduce the risk-sharing achieved by the private insurance arrangement it-
self. Thus it is unclear a priori which eÞect may dominate or whether a combination of
public and private insurance may be optimal.
In addition to the assumption that the government cannot observe illness, it is as-
sumed that the government cannot observe the workings of the private insurance arrange-
ment (i.e., it cannot observe the consumption of individuals), but can only observe an
individual's employment status. Thus the tax or subsidy can only be based on employ-
ment status and not consumption. Further we analyse a static public insurance where
tax or subsidy depends only on current employment status. Thus the public insurance
scheme we consider here is of the same form as that examined in Section 4. It is simply
a tax on the employed of ² 2 [0;w] and a subsidy to the unemployed of ». It is assumed
that the public insurance is revenue neutral. Given that moral hazard problem is solved,
so that the fraction of the population unemployed is indeed p, the condition for revenue
neutral insurance is as before (1   p)² = p».
For given (»;²), the private insurance scheme will solve exactly the same problem as
given in Section 3, except that income in the employment state is now b + w   ², and in
the unemployment state it is b + ».
The relevant moral hazard constraint of the government is that of a worker in the
private insurance scheme but contemplating shirking and collecting government unem-
ployment insurance even though not ill. Such an individual will be observed as shirking
by his fellows and therefore will receive no future beneßts from the private insurance
arrangement. We now show that if we consider the steady-state of the private insur-
21ance scheme, the moral hazard constraint for the government is indeed equation (10) of
Section 4.
Lemma 11 The moral hazard constraint in the model with both public and private
insurance is given by (10), i.e., it is the same as in the model with only public
insurance:
u(b + w   ²) µ v(b + »):
Suppose that this equation holds and consider an employed agent in the private insurance
arrangement who is contemplating feigning ill health to take advantage of the government
subsidy to the unemployed. As demonstrated in Subsection 3.3 a healthy and employed
worker at t receives U(ht 1) = 0, where the surplus is now measured relative to what they
would have outside the private insurance scheme, i.e. b+w ² for the employed and b+»
for the unemployed. If illness is feigned, the current utility gain over autarky would be
v(b+») u(b+w  ²). By assumption, the feigning of ill health would be recognized by
fellow members of the private insurance scheme so that in the future the individual would
not participate in private insurance and would be reliant only on government insurance.
Since the public insurance scheme respects the moral hazard constraint of equation (10),
no-one participating in the government insurance scheme will feign ill health and hence
the future net surplus of any individulal feigning ill health in the current period is zero.
Thus the overall gain to an individual in the private insurance scheme of feigning ill health
is v(b+») u(b+w ²) which is non-positive by assumption. Thus given that U(ht 1) = 0,
equation (10) is necessary and suácient for no individual to have an incentive to feign
illness at t.
Remark 6 Since the moral hazard constraint is the same whether an agent is re-
ceiving private insurance or not our analysis also applies to the situation where
there is some fraction of agents outside the private insurance scheme. Thus it is
possible to undertake a welfare analysis of the eÞect of public insurance even when
only a fraction of the agents participate in private insurance. Clearly the smaller
the fraction of the population that are members of a private insurance scheme, the
greater the weight that will be given to public insurance.
Remark 7 In line with Section 4, we do not consider negative taxes, i.e. taxation
of the unemployed. Although there is a lower bound on consumption of b, negative
taxes may be feasible if it could be guaranteed that the private insurance arrange-
ments stepped in to oÞset any tax on the unemployed. This would be impossible if
there were some fraction of agents outside the private insurance scheme. Since the
government cannot by assumption observe whether an individual receives private
insurance, we rule out negative taxes as infeasible.
22It is easy to construct examples such that for certain parameter values, public in-
surance alone will be optimal and for other parameter values private insurance will be
optimal. From Assumption 7 it is known that there will be no private insurance if the
risk-sharing gains are suáciently small, i.e. if the discount factor is suáciently small or
if the probability of unemployment is suáciently high. Thus if the parameter values are
such that no private insurance is feasible, and the government's moral hazard constraint
does not bind, then it is possible to raise welfare through public insurance alone. If the
moral hazard constraint binds before any private insurance becomes feasible, then pub-
lic insurance alone will be optimal. Equally if the discount factor is high enough that
the ßrst-best can be sustained by private insurance, then private insurance alone will
achieve the optimum as by Assumption 8 the government is constrained from achieving
the ßrst-best by the moral hazard constraint.
As we now show it is possible to construct examples where the government can
inadvertently lower welfare by increasing public insurance. That is there may be more
than 1-1 crowding out of private insurance. Equally it is possible to construct examples
where a combination of public insurance and private insurance can actually raise welfare.
Since it is diácult to obtain analytical results, our examples are constructed numerically.
For simplicity we will consider the case where u(c) = v(c) x = loge(c) x where x is
the disutility of labour. The aggregate welfare generated by the public insurance relative
to autarky is:
(1   p)(loge(b + w   ²)   loge(b + w)) + p(loge(b + »)   loge(b))
which is increasing in ² given Assumptions 4 and 8. The moral hazard constraint in this
case is
loge(w + b   ²)   loge(b + ») µ x
and this will limit the tax ² that can be imposed on the employed. The aggregate social
welfare in the steady-state generated by private insurance relative to the fall back of only
public insurance is
(1   p)(loge(c0)   loge(b + w   ²)) +
S 1 X
s=1
(1   p)ps(loge(c0)   loge(b + »)   sloge(1 + g)):
The steady-state for the private insurance can be computed as described in Subsection 3.3
and the net welfare from public insurance and private insurance calculated for diÞerent
values of public taxation ². The total welfare can then be computed3 and the diagrams
below show the welfare from public insurance, private insurance and total welfare as a
percentage of the ßrst-best welfare relative to autarky.
The following example shows that there can be more than 1-1 crowding out:
3It is assumed that only a fraction of agents of measure zero are outside the private insurance scheme
in the calculations below.











Figure 6: The Crowding-Out EÞect
Example 3 Suppose u(c) = v(c)   x = loge(c), b = 100, w = 300, p = 1
2, ® = 2
3,
x = loge(17
8 ). The welfare from public and private insurance and total welfare for
diÞerent values of tax (consistent with the moral hazard constraint) is plotted in
Figure 5. The maximum tax is ² = 60. At ² = 60, the public insurance scheme
generates 68:90% of the ßrst-best surplus. At this tax rate, the private insurance
generates an additional 22:63% of the ßrst-best surplus. Thus the public and private
insurance schemes together generate 91:53% of the ßrst-best surplus. At ² = 0 the
private insurance scheme alone generates 99:88% of the ßrst-best surplus. So the
optimum is to have no public insurance and have only private arrangements provide
unemployment insurance.
The next example demonstrates that a mixture of private and public insurance may
dominate either public or private insurance alone.
Example 4 Suppose u(c) = v(c)   x = loge(c), b = 515, w = 125, p = 4
5, ® = 19
20,
x = loge(58=53). The aggregate welfare for diÞerent values of tax is plotted in
Figure 5. With x = loge(58
53) the maximum tax is ² = 60. At ² = 60, the public
insurance scheme generates 83:21% of the ßrst-best surplus. At this tax rate, the
private insurance generates an additional 9:66% of the ßrst-best surplus. Thus
the public and private insurance schemes together generate 92:87% of the ßrst-best
surplus. At ² = 0 the private insurance scheme alone generates 89:70% of the










Figure 7: An Optimal Mix of Public and Private Insurance
ßrst-best surplus but still less than that achieved with the maximum tax rate of
² = 60
6 Conclusion
We have considered a model of the interaction between private and public insurance
schemes. The advantage of the private insurance scheme is that it does not face the
moral hazard constraint faced by government. However, the disadvantage of the private
insurance scheme is that it cannot enforce payments into the scheme in the way the
government scheme can.
We have developed a model of private insurance in a large economy using straight-
forward arbitrage arguments. The optimum private insurance scheme has a number of
interesting properties. The amount received falls with the length of unemployment and is
time limited. After a certain length of unemployment no insurance beneßts are received.
In the steady-state all the employed pay the same amount into the private insurance
scheme irrespective of their past unemployment history.
We have shown that there can be more than 1-1 crowding out of private insurance
by public insurance. That is a government that introduced additional public insurance
may end up lowering welfare because of the private insurance it crowds out. We have
also demonstrated by way of example that a mixture of public and private insurance may
maximise steady-state welfare.
25There remains work for further research. We have considered only the impact of the
public insurance on the steady-state. It would be interesting to understand how welfare
changes along any dynamic path toward a steady-state. The govenment in contrast to
the private sector is assumed to adopt a static taxation system that depends only on the
current employment status and not the employment history. Many government insurance
schemes are responsive to employment history and exhibit some features such as declining
and time limited beneßts that we have found to optimal in the private insurance scheme.
Again future research could address how a dynamic model of government insurance in-
teracts with private insurance. Further in our model unemployment is exogenous and
not aÞected by agents' decisions. Examining the welfare consequences in a model where
the extent of insurance had an impact on the level of unemployment could provide an
interesting extension of the model.
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